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Abstract 
The initial public offering (IPO) is the most important stage in the evolution of an 
entrepreneurial firm. While numerous studies have investigated the determinants of 
the going public decision and the post-IPO performance, few studies have studied 
factors that influence the transition speed from the entrepreneurial firm stage to the 
professional firm stage. Leveraging a unique sample of 428 firms listed on Growth 
Enterprise Market in Shenzhen Stock exchange between 2009 and 2016, we assert 
that the entrepreneurial founder of the IPO firm is the key determinant of the 
transition speed. Based on the Upper Echelon theory and institution-based view, we 
suggest that a founder’s personal characteristics and external institutions drive the 
time to IPO. Our findings reveal the strategic importance of the founder and 
contribute to an improved understanding of why firms vary in the “going public 
speed” in an important emerging economy, China. 
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1 Introduction 
The initial public offering (IPO) is the most important stage in the evolution of an 
entrepreneurial firm (Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002; Filatotchev et al., 2006). An 
entrepreneurial firm is often initiated by a less identified opportunity and supported by 
private funding. After initial success, the firm attempts to raise additional capital 
outside of the organisation through the stock market. While numerous studies have 
investigated the determinants of the going public decision and the post-IPO 
performance (Brav et al., 2000; Jain and Kini, 1999; Latham and Braun, 2010; 
Piotroski and Zhang, 2014), limited literature has studied factors that influence the 
transition speed from entrepreneurial firm stage to professional firm stage. Time to 
IPO, defined as the time elapsed between an entrepreneurial firm’s incorporation and 
its IPO (Shepherd and Zacharkis, 2001; Yang et al., 2011), is very meaningful for 
entrepreneurial firms and investors as it can be considered as a measure of firm 
performance at the early stage of a firm’s life cycle (Chang, 2004). 
Existing studies have examined time to IPO by addressing the effects of top 
executives and external players (e.g. the involvement of venture capital) in developed 
economies. However, two issues have not been fully studied. First, though we admit 
the fact that top executive (i.e. chief executive officer) plays a leading role after the 
stock flotation, the top executive may only be appointed after the IPO, in which the 
person played no role in determining the pace of going public. To study the time to 
IPO, we argue that we need to trace back to the starting point of the firm and explore 
the effects of the firm’s creator. Second, existing research was conducted 
overwhelmingly in developed economies where the formal institutions (i.e. legal 
framework and market-supporting system) are well established. It is therefore 
interesting to explore the factors which can drive the firm’s IPO speed in the 
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contextual environment of emerging economies. In emerging economies, institutions 
are underdeveloped and change continually (Peng, 2003). Many emerging economies 
are endeavouring to move towards marketisation, but the firm’s activities are still 
constrained by government intervention and regulations. While an entrepreneurial 
firm’s IPO are shaped by well-established market-supporting institutions in developed 
economies, the interplay of the with complex institutional contexts in emerging 
economies remains unclear (Alon and Rottig, 2013).   
This paper intends to address these research gaps and endeavours to answer the 
question: What determines an entrepreneurial firm’s time to IPO in an emerging 
economy? We adopted upper echelon theory and institution-based view to explain the 
effects of the founder’s characteristics and external institutions on this important 
strategic decision for entrepreneurial firms in an important emerging economy, China. 
Through answering the question, two contributions thus emerge. First, we contribute 
to the IPO speed literature by extending the focus to the fountainhead of an 
entrepreneurial firm. Specifically, through the “microfoundation” lens (Barney and 
Felin, 2013; Contractor et al. 2019; Eisenhardt et al., 2010; Felin et al., 2015), we 
study the effect of the characteristics of the founder on the time to IPO. Though IPO 
speed literature has explored the effects of managerial characteristics (Yang et al., 
2011) and venture capital involvement (Shepherd and Zacharkis, 2001) on the time to 
IPO, an entrepreneurial firm’s founder has been overlooked in previous studies. Being 
the creator of a firm, the founder is the initial architect of the organisation’s structure 
and strategy (Fattoum-Guedri et al., 2018; Franco and Prata, 2019; Jayaraman et al., 
2000; Nelson, 2003). A large number of empirical studies have confirmed founder’s 
profound influence on a firm’s strategy and performance in the early stage of firm’s 
life cycle (Ahmed and Brennan, 2019; Block, 2012; Dencker and Gruber, 2015; Fern 
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et al., 2012; Franco and Prata, 2019; He, 2008). In this role, the founder exercises 
stronger strategic leadership in every aspect of the operation in comparison to other 
hired managers and venture capitals (Bigley and Wiersema, 2002; He, 2008). We 
examine the founder’s observable characteristics as key microfoundation of the time 
to IPO. This paper develops our knowledge about the way the founder’s 
characteristics drive the firm’s IPO process. 
Second, this paper articulates the importance of founder for entrepreneurial firms 
under a contextual environment where formal institutions are underdeveloped. 
Institutions have been proved to exhibit ‘macro’ pressures towards firms’ strategic 
choices and performance (Peng and Heath, 1996; Peng et al., 2008). Previous studies 
have explored the interactions between institutions and firms and exerted informal 
institutions (e.g. social norms and culture) play a larger role when formal institutions 
are weak or even absent. This paper highlights the founder as the microfoundation and 
explaining the interplay between the founder and macro-institutions in influencing 
firm’s time to IPO.  
 
2 Theoretical Background and Hypothesis  
Time to IPO is an important topic because it not only reflects a firm’s 
performance prior IPO but also determines a firm’s ability to raise funding from the 
market in post IPO period (Chang, 2004; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001; Yang et al., 
2011). Previous studies examine time to IPO from two perspectives. One research 
stream addresses external factors. For instance, Chang (2004) finds that venture 
capital involvement and entrepreneurial firm’s network would speed up the IPO 
process. Shepherd and Zacharakis (2001) suggest that market factors, such as 
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geographic location and favourability of the IPO market accelerate the IPO process of 
venture capital-backed firms.  
Another stream of study adopts the upper echelon theory and identifies the 
importance of the firm’s top manager in the IPO process. Upper echelon theory 
suggests that the traits and characteristics of the top management team can shape 
organisational actions (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). According to this view, top 
executives’ characteristics influence the cognition and perception of the environment, 
which in turn lead to regularity and a predictable structure in organisations. Taking 
this theoretical aspect, Yang et al. (2011) examine IPO firm’s chief executive officer 
(CEO) and find that the CEO’s prior experience, network, and age significantly relate 
to the IPO speed in the U.S. While important contributions, the abovementioned 
studies overlook probably the most important player for the entrepreneurial IPO firm, 
the founder.  
Over the last decade, the “microfoundations” literature (Felin and Foss, 2005; 
Gavetti, 2005) has asserted that the micro-level (represented by the level of 
individuals and their interactions) is the nested antecedent to collective phenomena at 
the organisational level. In other words, a firm’s capabilities, performance, and 
strategies are essentially derived from the individuals’ endowment and characteristics 
(Felin et al., 2015). The microfoundations approach seeks to understand the 
organisation’s outcome by specifying the input of individuals and asserts that 
organisation and strategy studies should engage in lower, micro levels - individuals 
and their interaction (Barney and Felin, 2013). 
Being the creator of the firm, the founder is the most important individual who 
blueprints the initial structure, formulate strategy and enlighten culture of the 
organisation (Nelson, 2003). Through fulfilling these roles, a founder is likely to act 
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as the strategic leader who can guide the strategic direction and decision-making 
(Jayaraman et al., 2000). At the start-up stage, the founder usually serves as the chief 
executive. Holding a creative idea with the firm belief, a founder thus is the 
microfoundation of the entrepreneurial firm he/she created and is likely to have 
individual impacts on organisational structure and strategic direction for firms’ 
growth and development (Rubenson and Gupta, 1996).  
Recent literature has highlight the role of the founder in many aspects. For 
example, recent studies have examined the effects of the founder on entrepreneurial 
orientation  (Deb and Wiklund, 2017; McGee and Peterson, 2019; Vaznyte and 
Andries, 2019) and proposed the positive role of the entrepreneurial founder in 
improving an organization’s strategic orientation to be more risk‐embracing, 
innovative, and proactive in its decision‐making process. Other entrepreneurship 
literature has explored the influence of the founder on strategy and performance (e.g. 
Fattoum-Guedri et al., 2018; Hendricks et al., 2019; Jain and Tabak, 2008; 
Wasserman, 2017). However, a limited number of studies had examined the effects of 
the founder as ‘microfoundation’ for the entrepreneurial firm’s time to IPO. Even 
fewer studies explored the macro-level factors (e.g. institutions) on time to IPO. In the 
following sections, we discuss the relationship between the founder’s characteristics 
and institutions and the time to IPO (see Figure 1). 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
2.1 Founder-CEO Status 
IPO is an important evolution when an entrepreneurial firm turns into a public 
company. Compared with unlisted entrepreneurial firms, IPO firms face more critical 
external pressure from the stock market and deal with much wider stakeholders. Thus, 
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Filatotchev and Wright (2005) suggest that an IPO firm should adjust its management 
structure and governance system in order to accommodate the changed ownership 
structure and different stakeholders’ interests in the post IPO period. Therefore, a 
firm’s founder should cede control to professional managers in the post IPO stage as 
the firm’s growth requires extra expertise and resources of its founder can possibly 
provide (Chahine et al., 2011; Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004). 
Founder-CEO refers to the situation where the founder serves as the chief 
executive officer. Chief executive position is likely to enhance the founder’s power 
and hierarchical authority. Given the important role that a firm’s founders play in its 
initial conceptualisation and start-up, the dual leadership would consolidate the 
managerial power over the firm. The founder is often more entrenched and less likely 
to leave than are the top managers in established firms. A large number of studies 
have found that the founder would hold a personal stake in the firm they created and 
therefore have strong desire to maintain control over the company (Boeker and 
Karichalil, 2002; Daily and Dalton, 1992; Jain and Tabak, 2008; Shekshnia, 2008; 
Wasserman, 2003). Therefore, we expect the founder-CEO status would slow down a 
firm’s IPO speed. 
H1. The presence of a founder-CEO will positively influence a firm’s time to IPO. 
2.2 Founder’s Age  
An individual’s age is expected to influence many aspects of strategic choices 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Older executives would inevitably have more 
experience and connections in the industry (Peni, 2014) though they tend to be more 
conservative compared to youth counterparts (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). Age 
appears to be an important variable that may affect the attitudes toward risk. 
Empirical studies have found that older top managers tend to follow low-risk growth 
 8 
strategies whereas young managers are more willing to take a risky decision 
(Carpenter and Fredrickson, 2006; Jain and Tabak, 2008; Yang et al., 2011). Older 
founders may have reached the late stage of the career where financial and career 
securities become the top priority. They would therefore tend to avoid uncertainty and 
risky decisions, such as IPO, which could involve major changes in the strategic 
direction of a firm.  
Furthermore, a founder would normally be replaced by a professional manager 
to manage the firm after the IPO (Daily and Dalton, 1992; Filatotchev and Wright, 
2005) because required skill of managing a listed firm often exceed the founder’s 
ability and expertise (Chahine et al., 2011; Hendricks et al., 2019; Zahra and 
Filatotchev, 2004). The founder often considers the firm as his/her lifetime 
achievement. Older founders would have a greater psychological commitment to the 
organisation he created. Therefore, older founders would be reluctant to pursue IPO as 
the success of IPO may accelerate the founder being replaced by a professional 
manager. The conservative, risk-averse attribute and psychological commitment 
associated with an older founder would slow down the IPO speed. Hence we propose: 
H2. The founder’s age will positively influence a firm’s time to IPO. 
2.3 Founder’s Education.  
Education indicates an individual’s knowledge and skills and reflects an 
individual’s information-processing capability. A higher level of education creates 
broader knowledge and capability, which in turn helps to identify business 
opportunities, solve problems, and gain successes (Dickson et al., 2008). Education 
enables executives to cope with increasingly larger and complex firms and achieve 
successful performance outcomes (King et al., 2016). Sapienza and Grimm (1997) 
suggest that higher levels of founder’s education can lead to better firm performance.  
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On the strategic decision of taking the company public, Yang et al. (2011) 
suggest the higher an entrepreneur’s level of education, the more determined he/she 
would be. Such a desire can be attributed to the aim of acquiring additional resources 
from the stock market for further growth. Following this logic line, we argue that 
educational level facilitates the opportunities’ identification and also the transition 
from an entrepreneurial firm to a professional public firm. So, we hypothesise that: 
H3. The founder’s education level will negatively influence a firm’s time to IPO. 
2.4 Founder’s Political Connection 
Social capital is the ability to obtain benefits through an actor’s network of social 
relationships (Adler and Kwon, 2002). Entrepreneurship studies view social capital as 
a unique resource to gain competitive advantage and contribute to performance 
(Bamford et al., 2006; Florin et al., 2003; Li et al., 2008; Li et al., 2012). The obvious 
benefit associated with social capital is resource and information accession. Social 
capital facilitates access to broader sources of information and improves information’s 
quality, relevance, and timeliness (Li et al., 2008). Political connections are crucial 
social capitals in China.  
Political connections are very important for entrepreneurial founders. In emerging 
economies, such as China, the undeveloped market creates an uncertain environment 
and ineffective market (Peng et al., 2008). More importantly, the Chinese government 
controls significant portions of strategic resources and has considerable power to 
influence allocation channels (Li et al., 2012). Strong social network with the 
government helps the firm to gain access to valuable resources and information about 
industrial development and government policies. The main benefit of conducting IPO 
is to gain access to additional financial resources to fund the firm’s future growth. The 
strong political connection, however, can substitute to the IPO as a means to offer 
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resource accession. We, therefore, expect the founders with strong political 
connections would less likely to speed up the IPO process. Therefore,  
H4. The founder’s political connection will positively influence a firm’s time to IPO. 
2.5 Founder’s Experience.  
The founder’s influence on time to IPO may vary based on his/her past 
experiences. Successful entrepreneurs are able to perceive an opportunity based on 
their knowledge. The knowledge can be gained either through formal education or 
through previous working experience. Experiences also shape an individual’s 
cognition and perceptions towards the environment and help the firm to seek 
opportunities under uncertainty (Hambrick and Mason, 1984).  
Furthermore, a founder’s experiences are valuable assets and can help with 
resource acquisition. Previous experiences provide channels of communication and 
facilitate information flow among the firms and external environment. The founder 
can learn about business practices through their own social network, which is built 
through the working experience. Adler and Kwon (2002) comment that information 
acquired from the social network may be particularly influential because it often 
comes from a trusted source. This information is typically more timely than that 
derived from secondary sources. Extensive work demonstrates experience provides an 
important source of information about business practices and industrial development 
and hence plays a critical role in future strategy formulation and subsequent firm 
performance (Carpenter et al., 2001). An experienced founder can use their insight 
and experience to facilitate the IPO process (Yang et al., 2011).  
In addition, many studies have shown that top executives’ international 
experience is closely linked to the firm’s performance (Carpenter et al., 2001; Le and 
Kroll, 2017). International experience helps an individual develop knowledge and 
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global networks as well as skill to cope with complex information and dynamic 
environment. These skills and competencies can be a source of competitive advantage 
and superior firm performance (Daily et al., 2000). Therefore, rich experience 
enhances a founder’s ability to control these critical contingencies after the IPO. We 
suggest that: 
H5a. The founder’s experience will negatively influence a firm’s time to IPO. 
H5b. The founder’s foreign experience will negatively influence a firm’s time to IPO. 
2.6 Institutions and Time to IPO  
Institutions, which are defined as “the rules of the game” (North, 1990), have 
been proved to exhibit formal and informal pressures for firms, and directly affect 
firms’ strategic choices and performance. The institution-based view focuses on the 
interactions between institutions and firms, and exerts firm’s strategic choices and 
performances are the outcomes of such interactions (Peng and Heath, 1996). In other 
words, institutions determine directly how firms formulate and implement strategy 
because both formal and informal institutions have capacities to control and constrain 
managerial behaviour. For example, Peng and Heath (1996) argue that the internal 
growth of firms in transition economies is limited by institutional constraints. Thus, it 
is important to study institutions in emerging economies (Jimenez et al., 2017; Teng 
et al., 2018). In particular, formal institutions (e.g. political transparency, economic 
liberalisation, regulatory regime) are different from developed economies and 
experiencing huge changes during the transition period. 
In this study, we examine the effects of market-supporting institutions on the time 
to IPO. Market-supporting institutions in this study refer to sub-national institutions 
that regulate market transaction such as regulations and marketisation, and support the 
efficiency of market transactions and resources allocation. It is proverbial that market-
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supporting institutions play essential roles in both developed and emerging economies 
to influence firms’ strategy choices and activities. Meyer et al. (2009), for example, 
suggest that firm’s strategy is influenced by firms’ resource endowment and market-
support institutions. 
Our concept of market-supporting institutions focuses on formal institutions that 
support the efficiency of market transactions and resources allocation. Strong market-
supporting institutions create a more liberalised market where the firms can secure 
resources through market transitions. Lu et al. (2009) suggest that Chinese firms 
located in regions with higher levels of marketisation have better access to key 
resources. Park et al. (2006) argue that market liberalisation facilitates the flow of 
resources and enhances firm profitability and productivity in China.  
We argue that in a situation where market-supporting institutions are strong, it 
may take longer for entrepreneurial firms to conduct IPO. The IPO process involves 
uncertainty with respect to market competition and business opportunities and is very 
costly. Taking a firm public requires a large amount of time, effort and resources. A 
typical IPO process may take from 9 to 18 months and cost an average of 
approximately 7% to 14% of the gross proceeds (Latham and Braun, 2010). When 
entrepreneurial firms are operating in an environment with strong market-supporting 
institutions, they can easily gain access to resources and know-how via market 
transaction. Entrepreneurial firms, therefore, are less motivated to float as IPO might 
cause unnecessary costs and risks. Thus, we propose that: 
H6. Market-supporting institutions have a positive influence on the time to IPO.  
  
3 Methodology 
3.1 Sample and Data Source 
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Following several previous studies (e.g. Deeds et al., 2004; Yang et al., 2011), 
our data are primarily obtained from the IPO prospectus of each firm. As we interest 
in shedding lights on the relationship between founder’s characteristics and IPO speed 
in entrepreneurial firms in China, the only one way to obtain the public data on 
entrepreneurial firms is through using the IPO prospectus from Shenzhen Growth 
Enterprise Market (GEM).  In this study, therefore, the sample is selected from 511 
Chinese firms listed on Shenzhen GEM and underwent IPO during the period of 
January 2009 to April 20161. Majority of the firms listed on GEM are small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) which highly invested in R&D and having a great 
incentive on innovation. We included as many firms as possible during the process of 
data collection in May 2016. Therefore, we ended up with a full sample consisted of 
511 firms. According to the ‘Decision of the State Council on the Establishment of 
GEM’, firms listed on Shenzhen GEM must have outstanding main business, unique 
technology and great product-market potential but there is no restriction of the 
ownership status. Therefore, the main difference in firms listed on Shenzhen GEM is 
that a few of them do not belong to entrepreneurial firms. 
As we focus on entrepreneurial firms by distinguishing firms with the 
founder(s) from those which do not have founder(s). The processes of identifying the 
founder are that: (1) searching the keywords “founder” or “establish” in the IPO 
prospectus; (2) finding information about firm’s history and (previous) ownership in 
the section “Introduction of the issuer” to check if the firm was founded by 
governments or other governmental organisations; (3) searching on search engines 
(Google, Baidu) to confirm the funder status. This process left us with 428 of 511 
firms identified founder(s). In some cases, the founders could not be identified as the 
founders have retired, resigned, or died.  
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3.2 Variables 
The dependent variable is “Time to IPO”, measured as the number of years 
from the firm’s establishment to its IPO date (Fischer and Pollock, 2004; Yang et al., 
2011). 
The independent variables are the founder’s characteristics including founder-
CEO status, age, education, political connection, network experience, and foreign 
experience. 
Founder-CEO status. For the majority of the firms in our sample, the founder 
is the CEO of the firm at the time of IPO. In some firms, the founder however serves 
as the executive director, not the CEO. In theory, the founder-CEO status would have 
more control power over the firm (Fischer and Pollock, 2004). We code the variable 
as 1 if the founder is the CEO at the time of IPO, and 0 otherwise. 
Founder age. The age of the founder is related to a firm’s performance and 
strategies (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Weinzimmer, 1997). We expect that the 
founder’s age will impact on IPO speed. We calculate the age by using the born date 
of the founder reported in the IPO prospectuses. 
Education. The education background of the founder has been confirmed 
relating to the firm’s performance and strategies (Yang et al., 2011). We create an 
ordinal variable with a range from 0 to 4 to measure the highest degree owned by 
founder: 0, graduated from high school or below; 1, graduated from college institute 
(not a university and earned a three-year college degree); 2, graduate from university 
and earned an undergraduate degree (e.g. BA or BSc); 3, earned a master degree or 
equivalent (e.g. MA, MSc, MBA, or EMBA); and 4, earned a PhD degree.  
Political connection. The importance of firm’s political connections in 
emerging counties has been investigated in many studies (e.g. Li et al., 2008; Li et al., 
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2012). We treat this variable as a dummy variable and code as 1 if founder had 
political connection - was the member of the National People’s Congress or the 
member of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, or worked in the local 
or central government department or military department at or before the time of IPO, 
and 0 otherwise.  
Founder’s experience. The experience of the founder is linked to the firm’s 
strategies (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). We count the number of formal working 
experience that founder already had before the time of IPO. This variable also can be 
defined as the capability of the founder network. We also include the founder’s 
international experience in this study. The foreign experience of founder studying and 
working overseas can increase the founder’s human capital (Dietz and Bozeman, 
2005) thus can affect firm performance and the decision making of IPO. We code the 
variable as 1 if the founder has study or work experience abroad, and 0 otherwise. 
Market-supporting institutions. Compared to the majority of early studies, we 
emphasise that importance the formal institutions for measuring the external 
environments. Sub-national provincial-level data of market-supporting institution are 
used in the estimations. The data are drawn from Business Environment Index for 
China’s Provinces developed by Wang et al. (2013) who made four biennial reports 
for tracking the external factors (business environment) of the firms in China since 
2006. They use questionnaires to collect the data from more than 4,000 firms around 
the country (29 provinces, excluding Tibet and Qinghai province, due to the lack of 
sample). The questions in their questionnaire cover political, legal, social factors. For 
this study, the proxies for market-supporting factor (i.e. level of marketisation, 
government intervention, and government size) are used and the annual data are 
obtained by applying the linear interpolation. A higher level of the index of market-
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supporting institutions indicates less government intervention and more resource 
allocation through market-supporting institutions. 
In terms of control variables, we mainly focus on firm-level factors including, 
venture capital (VC) involvement, R&D ratio and firm size. Venture capital is 
supposed to speed up IPO speed to cash its investment in developed economies (Yang 
et al., 2011; Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). Furthermore, Shepherd and Zacharakis 
(2001) find out that venture capital with different statuses can have dissimilar effects 
on the speed to IPO. Although we do not have sufficient information to recognise 
which firm may have support from top reputation VC owners, the percentage of 
VC/equity, obtained from the IPO prospectuses, is controlled in our empirical models. 
We also consider the effect of R&D input of firms, defined as a ratio of R&D 
expenditure to sales. Jain and Kini (2008) point out that the increase of R&D input in 
IPO firms can enhance the value of the firms along with higher growth. The ratio is 
calculated by using the related figures in the financial statements of the IPO 
prospectuses. Also, we include firm size as a control variable using nature logarithm 
of total assets. In addition, we also control for the industry-specific and geographic 
factors by including two sets of dummy variables.   
We conclude the summary statistics and correlation between all the variables 
in Table 1. There is no seriously multi-collinear problem between each independent 
variable.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
3.3 Model Specification 
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We estimate the effect of founder’s characteristics on IPO speed while 
controlling for the effect of institutional quality using pooled ordered probit 
estimation2: 
𝐼𝑃𝑂 = 𝛽1𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽3𝑍 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽0 + 𝜀  (1)  
where 𝐼𝑃𝑂 represents Time to IPO; 𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 captures the effect of founder’s 
characteristics; 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 stand for the quality of market-supporting institutions at 
the provincial level; 𝑍 refers to the set of control variables; and 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 represent 
location and industry fixed effects.  
 
4 Results 
We present our empirical results in Tables 2. Our empirical strategy for 
investigating the hypotheses discussed above relies on presenting the results of 
baseline model first with relevant proxies for firm-level factors and the effect of 
institution added further and finally assessing the influence of founder’s 
characteristics. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
In column 1, we include three proxies for firm-level factors. Venture capital 
does not have a significant impact while both R&D ratio and firm size have a positive 
and significant effect on time to IPO, suggesting that firms with greater investment in 
R&D and larger firm size tend to take a longer period of time for the IPO.  
In column 2, using the institutional index, the effects of market-supporting 
institutions are controlled. A greater value of market-supporting institutions indicates 
less government intervention and a higher level of marketisation. The result shows the 
market-supporting institutions have insignificant effects on the time to IPO. R&D 
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ratio still exerts a positive and significant effect on IPO speed while other firm-level 
factors have insignificant effects. 
In column 3, we omit all the control variable and introduce the effect of 
founder’s characteristics with six measures namely, founder-CEO, age, education, 
political connection, network experience and foreign experience. The results show 
that both age and political connection have positive and significant effects on IPO 
speed while network experience and foreign experience have negative and significant 
effects. The effects of founder-CEO status and education on time to IPO are 
insignificant. These indicate that firms tend to spend more time before IPO if the 
founder is older or founder has political connection with government however firms 
are willing to fasten the speed to IPO if the founder has more network connection and 
foreign studying or working experience.  
In column 4, we add firm-level factors along with six proxies of founder’s 
characteristics. The effects of founder’s characteristics (in terms of the significance 
and the sign of the coefficient) are essentially unchanged.  
We include all the independent variables in columns 5. The effects of 
founder’s characteristics still remain. Market-supporting institutions have positive and 
significant effects on IPO speed, indicating that a more developed slows down the 
pace to IPO. Moreover, the most important finding is that, compared to results in 
columns 2, market-supporting institutions increase its significance and the level of the 
coefficient. This suggests that market-supporting institutions have a complementary 
effect with founder’s characteristics. Noticeable, after controlling for the effect of 
market-supporting institutions (columns 2 and 5), we can observe that the Pseudo R-
squares increase compared to the specifications without controlling them (columns 1 
and 3). Therefore, this confirms the importance of formal institutions.  
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4.1 Robustness Check 
In order to check the consistency of the empirical results, we employ ordered 
logit and OLS using the same dataset and model specifications. Table 3 reports the 
results using ordered logit estimation which are essentially unchanged, in terms of the 
significance and the sign of the founder characteristics and institution variables. 
Founder’s age and political connection have positive effects on IPO speed while 
founder’s experience and foreign experience exert a negative influence. There is a 
similar pattern of market-supporting institutions – it is positive but insignificant 
without controlling for the effect of founder’s characteristics and becomes 
significance after including the variables of founder’s characteristics. Next, we report 
results using Tobit estimation in Table 4. Founder characteristics and institution exert 
a robust effect since their significance and signs are stable across the table. Table 5 
reports the estimated results using OLS. The results are still broadly the same, 
although the significance of some variables (e.g. founder’s experience and market-
supporting institutions) reduces since OLS is less accurate when the dependent 
variable is ordinal.   
[Insert Table 3 here] 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
5 Discussion and Conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to provide an empirically grounded assessment of the state-
of-the-art in entrepreneurship studies in emerging economies by exploring the impacts 
of the founder’s characteristics and external institutional environment on a firm’s time 
to IPO. Previous studies have examined the impact of executives’ demographic factors 
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and external factors (e.g. venture capital involvement and firm’s network) on firm’s 
time to IPO. This paper extends this research line and highlights the important role of 
the founder in determining the time to IPO. Compared to large and mature firms where 
the complex organisational structure may constrain top managers’ ability to initiate 
change (Daily and Dalton, 1992), the founder of small entrepreneurial firms is 
responsible for strategic decision-making. In addition to the founder’s importance, we 
have also examined the role of the institutional environment on the firm’s time to IPO.  
This paper has two important findings. First, we adopted the upper echelon theory 
and investigate which characteristics of a founder would impact on a firm’s time to IPO. 
Time to IPO is important to potential investors because it is a good reflection of an 
entrepreneurial firm’s performance prior IPO and its potential for further growth 
(Chang, 2004; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001; Yang et al., 2011). As such, it is 
meaningful for us to explore the determinant factors of a firm’s time to IPO. Previous 
attempts to analyse the determinant of time to IPO have typically been based on top 
executive’s characteristics in a very different context. Though making important 
contributions, existing studies over-emphasis the role of top executives, but overlook 
the most important actor for an entrepreneurial firm, the founder. In this paper, we make 
an important contribution by explicitly linking the time to IPO with the firm’s founder. 
Our results indicate that elder founders with strong political connections are less 
likely to accelerate the IPO process while founders with international experience and 
rich previous working experience are more likely to put the IPO in the fast track. 
Founder-CEO status and education level have insignificant impacts on IPO speed in 
our sample. Starting with the beneficial role, richer prior experience offers the founder 
with knowledge and skills to accelerate and smooth the important transition from a 
private company to a public one. Prior working experience assists the founder with 
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board knowledge related to the industrial competition and hence enables the founder to 
address the great uncertainty surrounding an IPO. Furthermore, the founder’s 
international experience was found to be an accelerator for the firm’s IPO.  
Compared to the founder’s experience, the political connection was found a 
positive relationship with the time to IPO. In other words, the founder’s political ties 
slow down a firm’s pace of going public. The result is inconsistent with existing studies 
on firms’ IPO speed (Chang, 2004; Yang et al., 2011). For example, Yang et al. (2011) 
suggest a well-networked CEO can access the necessary resources to take a company 
public faster than a CEO with a limited. Their results were however based on high-
technology firms in the U.S. In emerging economies (such as China), political ties can 
help the focal firm to access to resources such as capital, human resources, and business 
partners. A well-connected founder could gain access to valuable resources via the 
informal political channels, which makes IPO less urgent. Our results reflect the 
strategic importance of social ties in emerging economies.  
Secondly, this paper articulates the importance of formal and informal institutions 
in the IPO process. Formal institutions have been proved to exhibit pressures towards 
firms’ strategic choices and performance. Previous studies exert informal institutions 
(e.g. social network) play a larger role when formal institutions are weak or even absent 
(Peng, 2003; Peng and Heath, 1996). This paper leverages this aspect and finds the 
founder’s political connection prolongs the IPO process. This result is practically 
interesting when we take the effects of formal institutions on the firm’s time to IPO into 
consideration.  Our results indicate the complementary effects of the founder’s political 
connection on market-supporting institutions in emerging economies and reflect the 
primary aim of IPO in emerging economies is to gain access to additional funding and 
resources. Under circumstances where an entrepreneurial firm can approach resources 
 22 
via its founder’s political connections or through the market transaction, the 
entrepreneurial firm slows down the IPO speed. 
Overall, our findings provide solid theoretical empirical bases for understanding 
entrepreneurial firm’s IPO speed. Building on microfoundation literature and upper 
echelon theory, this paper emphasises on the role of founder and stress that the founder 
are the fundamental units of analysis for entrepreneurial firm’s activities. By 
highlighting the founder as the microfoundation, we contribute to the microfoundation 
approach and illustrate the effects of the founder, the most powerful individual, on an 
entrepreneurial firm’s strategic outcomes. Existing microfoundation research mainly 
focuses on the chief executive in mature firms (e.g. Kunisch et al., 2019). We extend 
the line of argument and assert that the founder should be viewed as the 
microfoundation and starting point to study entrepreneurial firms.  
 This paper also contributes to institution-based view by exploring the interplay 
between the microfoundation and macro environment. Institution-based view addresses 
the macro-level pressure and its consequent pressure and/or motivation towards the 
firm’s strategic reactions. This paper underlines the founder as the microfoundation and 
bridge the micro-level of the firm with the macro environment by illuminating how 
would the founder’s political ties and market-supporting institution influence an 
entrepreneurial firm’s time to IPO.  
Managerial and Practical Implications 
Our findings have important managerial and practical implications. First, we 
indicate the importance of the founder as the microfoundation in determining the 
development speed before IPO. Our study reveals the essential role of the founder’s 
working experience and international experience on the firm’s development. Our 
findings reopen the debates on the role of the founder in shaping the firm’s strategy. 
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Conventional wisdom advocates the importance of collective constructs (e.g. 
organisational routine and culture) in driving a firm’s outcomes. Leveraging the recent 
microfoundation literature, this paper offers a clear signal to the investors that the 
founder does matter.  
As we have suggested in our study, market-supporting institutions slow down the 
IPO speed.  This result, together with the role of the founder’s political ties, implies 
the aim of the firm conducting IPO in emerging economies. The founder’s political 
ties can secure valuable resources for the firm, which slows down the IPO speed. 
Well-established market-supporting institutions facilitate resources’ liquidity. 
Therefore, the shorter time a firm used to conduct IPO, the more likely the firm is lack 
of political support and other resources. Potential investors who are interested in 
making investment would need further investigation on the potential of these firms. 
Limitation and Future Research 
This paper provides promising avenues for future research. First, we examine the 
influence of the founder on the time to IPO. Subsequent research can further develop 
this research line and explore the impacts of IPO speeds on post IPO performance. 
Second, our sample only contains IPO firms on GEM in China. Future research should 
also include firms listed on the main board of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the founder’s effects in China. Third, 
our findings may be applied only to Chinese entrepreneurial founders and firms. 
Therefore, it would be instructive to discover whether our findings can be generalisable 
from other emerging economies and even developed economies. Finally, future 
research should further explore the interaction between the founder (as microfoundation) 
and the macro environment and test the possible moderating/mediating effects between 
the individual and the institutions.  
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Note 
1 We had included as many firms as possible during the process of data collection in 
May 2016. Shenzhen Growth Enterprise Market is a new second board of China stock 
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market which has officially started providing listing and trading service since 
September 2019. Therefore, we ended up with a sample consisted of  511 firms.  
2 We decide to use this empirical method is due to the fact that the dependent variable 
is measured as an ordinal variable rather than a continuous variable. Therefore, it is 
less appropriate to apply the traditional approach - OLS estimation. In case of 
insisting of using OLS when the left-hand-side variable is ordinal, the regression in 
fact is a so-called linear probability model (LPM). The main drawback of using LPM 
is that, when independent variables are continuous, the classical assumption of 
linearity possibly cannot hold [Wooldridge, (2013), p.240]. We use pooled ordered 
logit estimation (which is similar to pooled ordered probit estimation) as the 
alternative method for robustness check. Also, we report the results using Tobit and 
OLS estimations in the robustness section for a comparison purpose. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics and correlation  
Note: Observation is 333. *** Statistical significance at 1% level (p value < 0.01); ** Statistical significance at 5% level (p value < 0.05); * 
Statistical significance at 10% level (p value < 0.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. IPO speed 11.0411 4.1549 1           
2. Founder CEO 0.5953 0.4916 -0.0840 1          
3. Age 52.8622 7.1945 0.2127*** -0.3319*** 1         
4. Education 1.6569 1.0993 -0.0265 0.0906 -0.1994***   1        
5. Political connection 0.2933 0.4559 0.0945* -0.0857 0.1280** 0.0077 1       
6. Network experience 6.8856 5.1600 -0.0231 -0.1505*** 0.1260** -0.1003 0.1631*** 1      
7. Foreign experience 0.1760 0.3813 -0.1085** -0.0740 -0.0201 0.1865*** 0.0238 0.1194** 1     
8. Venture capital 0.1978 1.2638 0.0761 0.0502 -0.0481 0.1227** 0.0892 -0.0446 -0.0069 1    
9. R&D ratio 0.0615 0.0395 0.0191 0.0865 -0.1100** 0.0461 -0.1130** 0.0053 0.0184 -0.0412 1   
10. Firm size 19.3893 0.6715 0.1551*** -0.1089** 0.1263** -0.0074 0.1817*** 0.2006*** 0.1032* 0.0431 -0.1660*** 1  
11. Market-supporting institution 3.2411 0.1103 0.1175** 0.0496 0.0065 0.0582 -0.0434 0.0678 0.0575 0.0352 -0.0346 0.0573 1 
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Table 2 Founder’s characteristics, institutions and IPO speed  
1 2 3 4 5 
Founder-CEO   0.1089 0.1117 0.0694  
  (0.1436) (0.1445) (0.1460) 
Age   0.0459*** 0.0509*** 0.0514*** 
   (0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0103) 
Education   -0.0224 -0.0420 -0.0320  
  (0.0612) (0.0630) (0.0632) 
Political connection   0.3572** 0.3245** 0.3125** 
   (0.1489) (0.1529) (0.1530) 
Founder’s experience   -0.0304** -0.0414*** -0.0454*** 
   (0.0128) (0.0132) (0.0134) 
Foreign experience   -0.5145*** -0.5832*** -0.5736***  
  (0.1757) (0.1772) (0.1773) 
Market-supporting institutions  2.7143   3.4343**  
 (1.6788)   (1.7245) 
Venture capital 0.0536 0.0591  0.0625 0.0694 
 (0.0462) (0.0463)  (0.0471) (0.0472) 
R&D ratio 3.6536** 3.6085**  4.5543** 4.5234**  
(1.8243) (1.8247)  (1.8377) (1.8381) 
Firm size 0.1926* 0.1684  0.2737** 0.2463** 
 (0.1052) (0.1063)  (0.1085) (0.1094) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 333 333 333 333 333 
Pseudo R2 0.0715 0.0729 0.0934 0.0995 0.1016 
Note: The dependent variable is IPO speed. Estimation is by ordered probit. The 
standard errors are shown below coefficients (in parentheses). *** Statistical 
significance at 1% level (p value < 0.01); ** Statistical significance at 5% level (p 
value < 0.05); * Statistical significance at 10% level (p value < 0.1). 
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Table 3 Robustness check: Ordered Logit  
1 2 3 4 5 
Founder CEO   0.2441 0.2493 0.2488  
  (0.2380) (0.2407) (0.2411) 
Age   0.0609*** 0.0666*** 0.0687*** 
   (0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0172) 
Education   0.0333 0.0099 -0.0127  
  (0.1062) (0.1111) (0.1116) 
Political connection   0.4907** 0.4840* 0.5098** 
   (0.2497) (0.2562) (0.2559) 
Founder’s experience   -0.0507** -0.0709*** -0.0768*** 
   (0.0225) (0.0231) (0.0231) 
Foreign experience   -0.8494*** -1.0683*** -1.1025***  
  (0.2997) (0.3082) (0.3114) 
Market-supporting institutions  1.7589   2.7049**  
 (1.1181)   (1.1385) 
Venture capital 0.0911 0.0901  0.0738 0.0752 
 (0.0673) (0.0673)  (0.0682) (0.0683) 
R&D ratio 5.1049* 5.4929*  7.1642** 7.8545***  
(2.9812) (2.9857)  (2.8864) (2.8883) 
Firm size 0.3896** 0.3957**  0.5911*** 0.6163*** 
 (0.1775) (0.1763)  (0.1818) (0.1840) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 333 333 333 333 333 
Pseudo R2 0.0576 0.0589 0.0723 0.0807 0.0838 
Note: The dependent variable is IPO speed. Estimation is by ordered logit. The 
standard errors are shown below coefficients (in parentheses). *** Statistical 
significance at 1% level (p value < 0.01); ** Statistical significance at 5% level (p 
value < 0.05); * Statistical significance at 10% level (p value < 0.1). 
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Table 4 Robustness check: Tobit   
1 2 3 4 5 
Founder CEO   -0.5435 0.0423 0.2318  
  (0.3893) (0.4223) (0.4252) 
Age   0.0359*** 0.1354*** 0.1488*** 
   (0.0108) (0.0293) (0.0296) 
Education   -0.2286 -0.0862 -0.0675  
  (0.1816) (0.1882) (0.1857) 
Political connection   1.1109** 1.0828** 1.0016** 
   (0.4524) (0.4475) (0.4424) 
Founder’s experience   -0.1128*** -0.1005** -0.1031*** 
   (0.0392) (0.0392) (0.0387) 
Foreign experience   -1.6334*** -1.6304*** -1.6943***  
  (0.5455) (0.5325) (0.5259) 
Market-supporting institutions  1.9730   3.9564**  
 (1.9878)   (1.8396) 
Venture capital 0.2086 0.1974  0.2371 0.2138 
 (0.1541) (0.1542)  (0.1446) (0.1430) 
R&D ratio 9.9921* 10.9175*  10.8713** 12.8010**  
(5.9146) (5.9729)  (5.4696) (5.4446) 
Firm size -0.0085 0.3188  0.3354*** 0.2705 
 (0.0319) (0.3288)  (0.0908) (0.2978) 
Constant 3.3697*** 3.3639*** 3.2034*** 3.1090*** 3.0661*** 
 (0.1265) (0.1262) (0.1132) (0.1137) (0.1105) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 333 333 333 333 333 
Pseudo R2 0.0628 0.0633 0.0706 0.0846 0.0855 
Note: The dependent variable is IPO speed. Estimation is by Tobit. The standard 
errors are shown below coefficients (in parentheses). *** Statistical significance at 
1% level (p value < 0.01); ** Statistical significance at 5% level (p value < 0.05); * 
Statistical significance at 10% level (p value < 0.1). 
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Table 5 Robustness check: OLS   
1 2 3 4 5 
Founder CEO   0.3747 0.4065 0.3187  
  (0.5180) (0.5103) (0.5114) 
Age   0.1356*** 0.1418*** 0.1399*** 
   (0.0364) (0.0361) (0.0360) 
Education   0.0363 -0.0191 -0.0443  
  (0.2272) (0.2287) (0.2285) 
Political connection   1.0834** 0.9978* 1.0321* 
   (0.5367) (0.5429) (0.5415) 
Founder’s experience   -0.0785* -0.1028** -0.1117** 
   (0.0472) (0.0476) (0.0478) 
Foreign experience   -1.6598** -1.8523*** -1.9158***  
  (0.6500) (0.6413) (0.6404) 
Market-supporting institutions  2.6200   3.7409*  
 (2.3590)   (2.0723) 
Venture capital 0.1808 0.1796  0.1728 0.1728 
 (0.1811) (0.1810)  (0.1750) (0.1744) 
R&D ratio 8.8958 9.5750  11.4394* 12.5863*  
(6.7553) (6.7800)  (6.4558) (6.4721) 
Firm size 0.7030* 0.6924*  0.8651** 0.8616** 
 (0.3887) (0.3886)  (0.3808) (0.3796) 
Constant -5.1453 -13.7342 2.4398 -16.2499* -28.5036** 
 (8.9939) (11.8585) (4.5696) (8.9869) (11.6461) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 333 333 333 333 333 
Pseudo R2 0.2465 0.2500 0.3118 0.3342 0.3412 
Note: The dependent variable is IPO speed. Estimation is by OLS. The standard errors 
are shown below coefficients (in parentheses). *** Statistical significance at 1% level 
(p value < 0.01); ** Statistical significance at 5% level (p value < 0.05); * Statistical 
significance at 10% level (p value < 0.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 39 
Figure 1 Research Model 
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